SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Code Annotated 1943-1995
1-1-1993

Title 68-69: Statutes to Telegraphic Transactions - 1993
Replacement Volume
Utah Code Annotated

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/uca

The Utah Code Annotated digital collection, hosted by Digital Commons, is brought to you for
free and open access by the James E. Faust Law Library at the S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Funds for this project have been provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
through the Library Services and Technology Act and are administered by the Utah State Library
Division. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu. Reprinted with
permission. Copyright 2020 LexisNexis. All rights reserved.
Recommended Citation
Utah Code Annotated Title 68 to 69 (Michie, 1993)

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Code Annotated 1943-1995 by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

TITLE 68
STATUTES
Chapter
1. Compilation of 1953 Code [Repealed].
2. 1933 Revision.
3. Construction.
4. Utah Commission on Uniform State Laws.

CHAPTER 1
COMPILATION OF 1953 CODE
(Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 67,

68-1-1 to 68-1-9.

§

67.)

Repealed.
relating to compilation of the 1953 Code, were
repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 67, § 67.

Repeals. - Sections 68-1-1 to 68-1-9 (L.
1951, ch. 116, §§ 1 to 7; 1951 (1st S.S.), ch. 22,
§ 1; 1953, ch. 127, § 1; 1973, ch. 197, § 12),

CHAPTER 2
1933 REVISION
Section
68-2-1.
68-2-2.
68-2-3.
68-2-4.
68-2-5.

68-2-1.

Short title - Effective date.
Repealed.
General repeal - Of prior laws Exceptions and reservations.
Laws of 1933 deemed subsequent
to revision.
Tenure of office not affected Exceptions.

Short title -

Section
68-2-6.
68-2-7.
68-2-8.
68-2-9.
68-2-10.

Accrued rights not affected by repeal.
Effect on limitation of actions.
Effect on offenses committed.
Effect on suits and prosecutions
pending.
"Heretofore" and "hereafter" defined.

Effective date.

This revision of the laws of Utah shall be known as the "Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933," and shall take effect at a time designated by the governor by
proclamation as may be provided by law.
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 88-1-1.
Compiler's Notes. - Since the Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, formed the basic law
upon which both the 1943 and 1953 compila-

tions are based, this chapter is compiled and
continued in the 1953 compilation.
For former analogous provisions, see R.S.
1898, § 2479; Comp. Laws 1907, § 2479.
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1933 REVISION

68-2-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Scope of revision.
In general.
The counterpart of this section in R.S. 1898
was discussed at length in Pratt v. Swan, 16
Utah 483, 52 P. 1092 (1898).
Scope of revision.
The Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is not a

mere compilation by the code commissioners,
but is an entirely new enactment by the Legislature, and the enactment gives force and effect to every provision therein the same as if
single chapters had been enacted making
changes and amendments. State Tax Comm'n
v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P.2d 171 (1936).
As to effect of mere compilation on the other
hand, see Lyman v. Martin, 2 Utah 136 (1877).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 271, 272.
Key Numbers. - Statutes €=> 144.

68-2-2.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 68-2-2 (L. 1933, ch. 76,
l; C. 1943, 88-1-1.10), relating to adoption of
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, for the pur§

68-2-3.

pose of amending or repealing laws by reference thereto, was repealed by Laws 1984, ch.
67, § 67.

General repeal - Of prior laws - Exceptions
reservations.

and

All acts of a general and permanent nature passed by the Legislature of the
state of Utah prior to its twentieth regular session are hereby repealed, saving
and excepting the following, subject to the limitations and exceptions herein
expressed, to wit:
(1) Those providing for the issue, validation, disposition, exchange or
redemption of any bonds or warrants of the territory or state of Utah, or of
any county, municipality or school district therein, in so far as such acts
or resolutions affect any such bonds or warrants now outstanding and
unpaid.
(2) Those accepting grants of land, or money, or other property for the
territory or state of Utah, or for any subdivision or institution thereof,
together with conditions, restrictions and limitations attached to such
grants.
(3) All validating acts.
(4) Acts relating to the transition from territorial to state government.
(5) Title 50 Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, relating to inheritance tax,
and all amendments thereof; Title 106 Compiled Laws of Utah 1917,
relating to taxation, and all amendments thereof; Section 4575 Compiled
Laws of Utah 1917, relating to a state tax for high school purposes; chapters 64, 114, 116, 117, 120, 122 and 123 Laws of Utah 1919, relating to
taxation; chapters 8, 9 and 18 Laws of Utah 1919, Special Session, relating to taxation; chapters 40, 132, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139 and 140 Laws of
Utah 1921, relating to taxation; chapters 2, 7, 22, 68, 96 and 97 Laws of
Utah 1923, relating to taxation; chapter 14 Laws of Utah 1925, relating
to assessment of shares of stock in banks; chapters 64 and 74 Laws of
Utah 1927, relating to taxation; chapter 69 Laws of Utah 1929 relating to
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a tax rate for county purposes, and chapters 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44 and
53 Laws of Utah 1931; with the intent for the purpose and to the end that
all existing laws relating to revenue and taxation shall apply to and
govern the appraisement of property for taxation, the levy, assessment,
equalization, apportionment, lien, collection and enforcement of taxes and
the sale, disposition and redemption of property liable to tax, as to taxes
authorized, levied and assessed prior to the time this revision is adopted
and takes effect, and that the provisions of this revision shall apply to and
govern as to taxes authorized, levied and assessed after the time this
revision is adopted and takes effect.
(6) Chapter 68, Laws of Utah, 1919, as amended by chapter 73, Laws of
Utah, 1921, and by chapter 9, Laws of Utah, 1923, and by chapters 98 and
107, Laws of Utah, 1925, and by chapters 68 and 80, Laws of Utah, 1929;
also Title 26, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as amended by chapter 41,
Laws of Utah, 1919, and by chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1921, and by
chapters 48 and 73 Laws of Utah, 1923, and by chapters 69 and 109, Laws
of Utah, 1925, and by chapters 32, 33 and 82, Laws of Utah, 1929; relating to irrigation, drainage and conservation districts.
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C.

1943, 88-1-2.

Compiler's Notes. - The reference to "acts
. . . passed by the Legislature ... prior to its
twentieth regular session" in the introductory
language means those acts passed before Laws
1933.
Title 50 and § 4575 of Comp. Laws 1917,
cited near the beginning of Subsection (5),
have been repealed.
Title 106 of Comp. Laws 1917, cited near the
beginning of Subsection (5), was §§ 5861 to
6109, and presently appears as § 10-8-4 and

various sections throughout Title 59. See the
Table of Corresponding Sections in the Tables
volume .
Title 26 of Comp. Laws 1917, referred to
near the middle of Subsection (6), was §§ 2040
to 2073, and presently appears as §§ 17A-l501 et seq.
As to disposition of the particular session
laws cited throughout this section, see the Table of Session Laws in the Tables volume.
Cross-References. - 1935 Validating Act,
§§ 55-3-36 to 55-3-38.
1937 Validating Act, §§ 55-3-39 to 55-3-42.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Laws in force before statehood.
In general.
The general repealing clause of R.S. 1898
was applied in Pratt v. Swan, 16 Utah 483, 52
P. 1092 (1898).

Laws in force before statehood.
Twelve-man jury held legally capable of being impaneled by district court after statehood
for trial of defendant indicted for noncapital
felony before statehood. State v. Hart, 19 Utah
438, 57 P. 415 (1899), applying R.S. 1898,
§ 2480.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 282.
Key Numbers. - Statutes ..., 152.
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1933 REVISION

68-2-4. Laws of 1933 deemed subsequent

to revision.

The enactment of this revision shall not affect or repeal any act of the
Legislature passed at any time during the twentieth regular session, and all
such acts shall have as full effect as if passed after the enactment of this
revision, and so far as such acts vary from, or conflict with, any provision
contained in this revision they are to have effect as subsequent statutes, and
as repealing any portion of this revision inconsistent therewith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2481;
C.L. 1917, § 5831; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-1-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 274.
145.
Key Numbers. - Statutes

68-2-5.

Tenure of office not affected -

Exceptions.

All persons who at the time when the said repeal shall take effect shall hold
any office under the statutes hereby repealed shall continue to hold the same
under the tenure thereof, except those offices which are abolished, and those
as to which a different provision is made by these revised statutes.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2482;
C.L. 1917, § 5832; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-1-4.
Compiler's Notes. - The term "statutes

hereby repealed" apparently means those prior
laws repealed by § 68-2-3.
Cross-References. - State officers and employees, Title 67.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
483, 52 P. 1092 (1898); Everill v. Swan, 17
Utah 514, 55 P. 68 (1898); Moreton v. Swan, 20
Utah 79, 57 P. 718 (1899).

Policemen and firemen.
Police and fire officials who were appointed
to office before 1898 statutes became operative
continued in office. Pratt v. Swan, 16 Utah

68-2-6. Accrued rights not affected by repeal.
This repeal of existing statutes shall not affect any act done, any right
accruing or which has accrued or has been established, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before the time when such repeal
takes effect; but the proceedings in such cases shall be conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes as far as consistent.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2483;
C.L. 1917, § 5833; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-1-5.

Compiler's Notes. - The term "repeal of
existing statutes" apparently means those
prior laws repealed by § 68-2-3.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

*

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes
274.
Key Numbers. - Statutes ""' 145.

68-2-7.

Effect on limitation of actions.

When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for
acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to
run before these revised statutes go into effect, and the same or any other
limitation is prescribed in these revised statutes, the time which has already
run shall be deemed a part of the time prescribed as such limitation by these
revised statutes.
Cross-References. - Limitation of actions,
Title 78, Chapter 12.

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2484;
C.L. 1917, § 5834; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
antecedent sections, but to a reaffirmation
thereof. Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah
426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114 A.L.R. 726 (1937).

Effect of reenactment.
Reenactment of statutes of limitation by
1933 revision amounted not to a repeal of the

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
§

C.J.S. 8.

68-2-8.

Key Numbers. 6(10).

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

Effect on offenses

Limitation of Actions

e,,

committed.

No offense committed, and no penalty or forfeiture incurred, under any
statute hereby repealed before the repeal takes effect shall be affected by the
repeal, except that when a punishment, penalty or forfeiture is mitigated by
the provisions herein contained such provisions shall be applied to a judgment
pronounced after the repeal.
History: R.S. 1898 &
C.L. 1917, § 5835; R.S.
88-1-7.
Compiler's Notes. "statute hereby repealed,"
following § 68-2-5.

C.L. 1907, § 2485;
1933 & C. 1943,

The term "provisions herein contained" apparently means Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933. See § 68-2-1 and notes thereto.
Cross-References.
- Ex post facto law or
law impairing obligation of contracts prohibited, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 18.

As to meaning of
see compiler's note

NOTES TO DECISIONS
State v. Woolsey, 19 Utah 486, 57 P. 426
(1899).

ANALYSIS

Mitigation of punishment.
Pre-statehood provisions.
Purpose of section.
Mitigation of punishment.
The punishment for the crime of grand larceny was not mitigated by any of the provisions of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898.

Pre-statehood provisions.
Twelve-man jury held legally capable of being impaneled by district court after statehood
for trial of defendant indicted for noncapital
felony before statehood. State v. Hart, 19 Utah
438, 57 P. 415 (1899).
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1933 REVISION

Purpose of section.
The plain intent of this section was to steer
clear of any difficulty arising from the enactment of ex post facto laws and retain in force
the former Crimes and Punishment Act so far

as it related to offenses committed prior to the
time the "Penal Code" went into effect. People
v. Sloan, 2 Utah 326 (1877) (decided under
prior law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes
Key Numbers. - Statutes

68-2-9.

§
,s=,

276.
147.

Effect on suits and prosecutions

pending.

No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal takes effect, for an offense
committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be conformed to the provisions
of these revised statutes as far as consistent.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2486;
C.L. 1917, § 5836; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-1-8.
Compiler's Notes. -The term "this repeal"
apparently means the repeal of certain prior
laws by § 68-2-3.

Cross-References. - Ex post facto law or
law impairing obligation of contracts prohibited, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
for trial of defendant indicted for a noncapital
felony before statehood. State v. Hart, 19 Utah
438, 57 P. 415 (1899).

ANALYSIS

Operation and effect of saving clause.
Pre-statehood provisions.
Purpose of section.

Operation and effect of saving clause.
Without saving clause no judgment could be
rendered in the suit. Rhemke v. Clinton, 2
Utah 438 ( 1877).
Pre-statehood provisions.
Twelve-man jury held legally capable of being impaneled by district court after statehood

68-2-10.

"Heretofore"

Purpose of section.
The plain intent of this section was to steer
clear of any difficulty arising from the enactment of ex post facto laws and to retain in force
the former Crimes and Punishment Act so far
as it related to offenses committed prior to the
time the "Penal Code" went into effect. People
v. Sloan, 2 Utah 326 (1877) (decided under
prior law).

and "hereafter" defined.

The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter," as used in these revised statutes,
have relation to the time when the same take effect.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2487;
C.L. 1917, § 5837; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-1-9.

Cross-References. - Rules of construction
as to words and phrases, § 68-3-11.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
had been a publication of the enactment.
Farrel v. Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 P. 843 (1888)
(decided under prior law).

Meaning of "thereafter."
The word "thereafter" in an amendatory act
has been held to mean after the amendment
goes into effect, which would occur when there

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 399.
Key Numbers. - Statutes e,, 248.

CHAPTER 3
CONSTRUCTION
Section
68-3-1.
68-3-2.
68-3-3.
68-3-4.
68-3-5.
68-3-6.
68-3-7.
68-3-8.

68-3-1.

Section
68-3-9.
68-3-10.

Common law adopted.
Statutes in derogation of common
law liberally construed - Rules
of equity prevail.
Retroactive effect.
Civil and criminal remedies not
merged.
Effect of repeal.
Identical provisions deemed a
continuation, not new enactment.
Time, how computed.
When a day appointed is a holiday.

68-3-11.
68-3-12.
68-3-13.

Seal, how affixed.
Joint authority is authority to
majority.
Rules of construction as to words
and phrases.
Rules of construction.
Printing boldface in numbered
bills - Purpose - Effect Power of Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel
to change.

Common law adopted.

The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural
and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
Cross-References. - Common-law crimes
abolished, § 76-1-105.
Married women's property rights,§ 30-2-1 et
seq.

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2488;
C.L. 1917, § 5838; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Champerty.
Construction and application.
Corporate purchase of stock.
Criminal law.
Divorce and dower.
Emancipation.
Forcible entry and detainer.
Married women.
Statute of uses.

Water rights.
Writ of elegit.

Champerty.
Common law on subject of champertous contracts held modified by former statute providing that "measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys and counselors at law is left to agreement, express or implied, of parties." Croco v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 311, 54 P.
985, 44 L.R.A. 285 (1898); Kennedy v. Oregon
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68-3-1

Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 325, 54 P. 988 (1898);
Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P.
999 (1900).

the statutes or Constitution of the United
States or of Utah. State v. C.R., 797 P.2d 459
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Construction and application.
This section, by implication at least, excludes common law from all subjects that are
regulated by statute. Rio Grande, W. Ry. v.
Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586
(1909).
The common law of England was not adopted
in this territory or state until this section was
enacted. Nor does this section adopt its rigor
and harshness, but only so much as was and
had been generally recognized and enforced in
this country, and as is and was suitable to our
conditions. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148
P. 1096 (1915).
We adopted the common law of England only
where it is suitable to our conditions, morals,
history and background. Generally, we look to
the system of common law and equity which
prevails in and has been and is now being developed by the decisions of this country and we
reject the common law of England which is not
suitable or adapted to our needs, morals or
ideals. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342
P.2d 94 (1959).

Forcible entry and detainer.
The English statute (5 Richard, II) "was a
part of the common law as adopted by the
American jurisdictions." Buchanan v. Crites,
106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167
(1944).

Corporate purchase of stock.
Under English common law as adopted by
Utah, a corporation could not purchase its own
stock in absence of express statutory or charter
authority. Shumaker v. Utex Exploration Co.,
157 F. Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1957).
Criminal law.
Criminal statute covering phase of common
law would not be construed as merely restating
common law where wording indicated intent to
broaden or change common law. Oleson v.
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
Divorce and dower.
Under this section, common-law rule that a
divorce a vinculo bars dower has been adopted.
Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 1 P. 465
(188ll.
Common law respecting dower remained in
force during all time Utah remained a territory, and continued in force after it became a
state, except as modified by statutory enactment. Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 P.
20 (1906).
Emancipation.
The common-law doctrine of emancipation of
minors is, by virtue of this section, a part of the
law of this jurisdiction constituting the rule of
decision in Utah courts, unless it conflicts with

Married women.
The English common law, with its rigorous
limitations imposed upon married women, was
not adopted in the territory of Utah, but only
so much thereof as was applicable to the conditions of the new territory. Hatch v. Hatch, 46
Utah 116, 148 P. 1096 (1915).
The common-law right of the husband to sue
another person for criminal conversation with
his wife, based on the theory of a trespass
against the wife which had to be brought by
the husband because he and the wife were one,
is contrary to law on that subject as developed
in this country on the concept of the rights of
married women and such a right did not become part of the law of Utah by virtue of this
section. However, the law of this state does authorize an action to recover damages for criminal conversation based on the exclusive right
of either spouse to intercourse with the other.
Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.2d 94
(1959).
Notwithstanding this section, prior will of
woman was not revoked by her subsequent
marriage, contrary to rule at common law. Estate of Armstrong v. Logan, 21 Utah 2d 86,440
P.2d 881 (1968).
Statute of uses.
Although statute of uses never became part
of English common law and has not been
adopted by Utah Legislature, rule of law,
which executes passive or naked trust and
vests legal title in person having use, is part of
Utah common law. Henderson v. Adams, 15
Utah 30, 48 P. 398 (1897).
Water rights.
The Legislature, by this section, did not intend to adopt the common-law doctrine as to
riparian owners, thereby divesting itself of title to bed of navigable waters. State v. Rolio,
71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987 (1927).
Writ of elegit.
Writ of elegit did not exist in territory of
Utah. Thompson v. Avery, 11 Utah 214, 39 P.
829 (1895).
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STATUTES
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common
Law §§ 13 to 18.
C.J.S. -15A C.J.S. Common Law§§ 11, 13
to 15.
Key Numbers. - Common Law ¢=> 12.

Utah Law Review. - Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992
Utah L. Rev. 449.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Interpreting Statutes Faithfully - Not Dynamically, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1353.

68-3-2.

Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed - Rules of equity prevail.

The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489;
C.L. 1917, § 5839; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-2.

Cross-References. - One form of civil action; law and equity administered in same action, Rule 2, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statutes are to be liberally construed to give
effect to their purpose and promote justice but
they are not to be distorted beyond the intent
of the legislature. Stanton Transp. Co. v.
Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959).

ANALYSIS

In general.
Amendment of pleadings.
Decisions of foreign courts.
Garnishment proceedings.
Inheritance laws.
Liability of city.
Life insurance.
Penal statutes.
Questions of novel impression.
Remedial statutes.
Rules of equity prevail.
-Forfeitures.
Statutes of foreign states.
Worker's compensation.
Cited.

In general.
This section is mandatory. Hammond v.
Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918).
This section abrogates the common-law rule.
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757
(1906); State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 432, 226 P.
904 (1924).
When a statute charges one with a duty or
imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so
with sufficient clarity that one of ordinary intelligence will understand what he is required
to do, and, in case of alternative choices, he can
comply by selecting the one least burdensome
to him. Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333
P.2d 943 (1959).

Amendment of pleadings.
Requirement in this section that provisions
of statutes and proceedings under them be liberally construed with view to effect statutes'
objects and to promote justice applies, at least
in matter of amendment of pleading, as well
when it is statutes of another state, as when it
is statutes of Utah, that are involved. Pugmire
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72
P. 385 (1903) (decided under prior law).
In action for wrongful death erroneously
commenced by intestate's widow and children,
who were only parties in interest, instead of
properly by personal representative, it was
error for trial court not to allow complaint to be
amended so as to substitute, as plaintiff, widow
in her capacity as administratrix. Pugmire v.
Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 P.
385 (1903) (decided under prior law).
Decisions of foreign courts.
Decisions of courts of other states under statutes differing from those of Utah are not controlling, it being duty of Utah courts to construe statutes of own state and give them such
effect as the Legislature intended, reasoning
from the language used and the purpose in
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view. State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P.
280 (1926).

tion. Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler,
44 Utah 64, 138 P. 1159 (1914).

Garnishment proceedings.
Statutes and rules governing procedure in
garnishment are to be liberally construed.
Remington Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 6 Utah 2d 182,
309 P.2d 368 (1957).

Remedial statutes.
Remedial statutes must be liberally construed. Castle v. Delta Land & Water Co., 58
Utah 137, 197 P. 584 (1921).

Inheritance laws.
This section has been applied to construction
of inheritance laws. In re Garr's Estate, 31
Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906).

-Forfeitures.
Under the last sentence of this section, it
matters not whether the action is one in equity
or at law; the rules of equity respecting forfeitures must prevail. Both equity and good conscience abhor forfeitures, especially for acts or
omissions long past. Moran v. Knights of
Columbus, 46 Utah 397, 151 P. 353 (1915).

Liability of city.
While the rule that statutes in derogation of
the common law must be strictly construed has
been abrogated in this state, nevertheless, if
the liability imposed on city by statute is limited to failure to keep its streets in repair and
unobstructed, this section precludes extension
of liability further than clear intendment of
statute. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah
573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941).
Life insurance.
Statutes governing life insurance contracts
must be liberally construed, and so as to protect the public. Utah Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 58
Utah 579, 200 P. 673 (1921).

Rules of equity prevail.

Statutes of foreign states.
Where a statute creates a right, the possessor thereof is entitled to have the right enforced in accordance with the rules of procedure outlined by our own statutes rather than
by those of some other state. National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 44 Utah 26,
137 P. 653 0913l.

Penal statutes.
Exceptions in penal statutes ought to be liberally construed in favor of one who is charged
with violation of statute. Schuyler v. Southern
Pac. Co., 37 Utah 581, 109 P. 458 (1910), affd,
227 U.S. 601, 33 S. Ct. 277, 57 L. Ed. 662
(1913).

Worker's compensation.
Phrase "out of and in the course of the employment" should be liberally construed. Chandler v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 213, 184 P.
1020, 8 A.L.R. 930 (1919).
By virtue of this section, the workers' compensation laws must be liberally construed,
and with the purpose of effectuating their beneficent and humane objects. Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135
P.2d 266 (1943).

Questions of novel impression.
Upon a question of the first impression the
court is required to give full effect to this sec-

Cited in AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev.
& Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986); Asay
v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 <Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Comment, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach
to Equitable Application, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89
(1987).
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Retroactive

Am. Jur. 2d. -

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

§§ 184, 185, 287 to 290.

C.J.S. - 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 15; 82
C.J.S. Statutes §§ 363, 393.
Key Numbers. - Statutes ec> 222, 239.

effect.

No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2490;
C.L. 1917, § 5840; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-3.
Meaning of "these revised statutes." The term "these revised statutes" apparently

means Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. See
§ 68-2-1 and notes thereto.
Cross-References. - Ex post facto law or
law impairing obligation of contract prohibited, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 18.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
1986, the trial court was correct in holding
that the Liability Reform Act did not apply.
Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah
1987).

ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Corporations.
-Contributions.
Fees.
Inheritance tax.
Joint and several liability.
Pending actions.
-Change
from law to equity.
Pensions.
Recorded documents.
Worker's compensation.
Cited.
Construction and application.
This section is merely a statement of wellsettled rules of statutory construction. Farrel
v. Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 P. 843 (1888).
This section is largely declaratory of pre-existing rules of statutory construction. Mercur
Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah
222, 52 P. 382 (1898).
In seeking to arrive at legislative intent,
statutes should be construed in light of existing circumstances. Industrial Comm'n v. Agee,
56 Utah 63, 189 P. 414 (1911).
This rule of construction has been recognized
and adopted by the federal courts. Kansas City
Life Ins. Co. v. Bowns, 129 F.2d 287 (10th Cir.
1942).

Corporations.
-Contributions.
In absence of an express authorization, there
could be no retrospective application of law relating to contributions by a corporation. Union
Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329
P.2d 398 (1958).
Fees.
This rule of construction was applied to a
law fixing the fees of jurors and witnesses. It
was held that the fees allowed should be those
fixed by law at the time service was rendered.
People v. Clayton, 5 Utah 598, 18 P. 628
(1888); People v. Pyper, 6 Utah 160, 21 P. 722
(1889).
Inheritance tax.
By virtue of this section and the general
rules of statutory construction, former section
determining amount of inheritance tax was to
operate prospectively and not retroactively. In
re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d
340 (1944).
Joint and several liability.
A statute, such as § 78-27-40, eliminating
joint and several liability may not be applied to
injuries occurring prior to its effective date. Because the injuries occurred in 1984, and the
Liability Reform Act was not effective until

Pending actions.
-Change from law to equity.
Amendment of statute, applied so as to render pending action to recover balance claimed
to be owing on contract for sale ofrealty, and to
foreclose lien for such balance, case in equity
and to make jury's findings merely advisory to
trial court, thus requiring facts to be reviewed
by Supreme Court on appeal under Utah
Const., Art. VIII, did not retroactively affect
parties to that action within purview of this
section. Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d
589 (1948).
Pensions.
This section has been applied to pension laws
established for benefit of disabled firemen. In
re Anthony, 71 Utah 501, 267 P. 789 (1928).
Recorded documents.
Application of the Utah Effects of Recording
Act(§ 57-4a-1 et seq.) was not retroactive, but
merely recognized that when the act took effect
on July 1, 1988, it operated to cure any thenrecorded defective instruments. This section
did not apply because the act did not operate
retroactively by curing prior to July 1, 1988,
any defective instruments. First Sec. Bank v.
Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 <D. Utah 1992).
Worker's compensation.
Legislative intent was that, in cases pending
and being prosecuted before 1919 amendment
to Workmen's Compensation Act became effective, the rights of claimants were to be determined as provided for in original act of 1917.
Industrial Comm'n v. Agee, 56 Utah 63, 189 P.
414 (1911).
A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. Thus, where workman quits work because
of health under a statute that at the time
stated that for compensation to be paid for dependent's death, it must occur within two
years, but statute was amended in 1951 to
make the time element five years and the
workman died within three years from the date
of his last employment, there was liability for
compensation due the dependents and statute
was not retroactive. Silver King Coalition
Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Utah 2d 1,
268 P.2d 689 (1954).
Cited in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245
<Utah 1988); State v. Lavoto, 776 P.2d 912
(Utah 1989); Worthington & Kimball Constr.
Co. v. C & A Dev. Co., 777 P.2d 475 (Utah
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1989); Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989);
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Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808
P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Comment, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach
to Equitable Application, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89
(1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
§§ 347 to 355.
C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 413.
A.L.R. - Retrospective operation of state
statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign
corporations on the basis of isolated acts or
transactions, 19 A.L.R.3d 138.

68-3-4.

Divorce, retrospective effect of statute prescribing grounds of, 23 A.L.R.3d 626.
Retrospective application of state statute
substituting rule of comparative negligence for
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d
1438.
Statutory change of age of majority as affecting pre-existing status or rights, 75 A.L.R.3d
228.
Key Numbers. - Statutes e=> 263.

Civil and criminal remedies not merged.

When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal remedy,
the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2491;
C.L. 1917, § 5841; R.S. 1933 & C.L. 1943,
88-2-4.

Cross-References. - Civil liability as not
affected by criminal liability, § 76-1-107.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes
Key Numbers. - Statutes

68-3-5.

§
e=>

390.
241(1).

Effect of repeal.

The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or
affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred,
or any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute
repealed.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2492;
C.L. 1917, § 5842; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-5.

Cross-References. - Effect of 1933 revision, §§ 68-2-5 to 68-2-9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendment of criminal statute.
-Reduction
of penalty.
Cause of action.
-Accrual prior to repeal.
Effective date of repeal.
Invalidity of repealing statute.
Municipal ordinances.
Repeal by later laws in conflict.
-Exception.
Repealed provisions considered in construction
of statutes.

Repeals by implication.
Unintentional repeal.
Water rights.
Cited.

Amendment of criminal statute.
-Reduction
of penalty.
Unless the Legislature specifies otherwise,
amendment of a criminal statute reducing the
penalty inures to the benefit of a person sentenced thereafter even though the offense was
committed and a guilty plea entered before the
effective date of the amendment. Belt v.
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Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 479 P.2d 791, affd on
rehearing, 25 Utah 2d 380, 483 P.2d 425
(1971).

Cause of action.
-Accrual prior to repeal.
A cause of action commenced under section
of Blue Sky Law that was repealed before action commenced is saved by this section.
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Secs. Co., 78 Utah 39,
300 P. 1040 (1931).
Effective date of repeal.
In case a statute is made effective only from
a future date, but in terms repeals the former
law upon the subject, repealing clause becomes
effective only at the time the statute goes into
effect. Board of Educ. v. Hunter, 48 Utah 373,
159 P. 1019 (1916).
Invalidity of repealing statute.
In case it is found that an entire statute, or
only a particular provision of a statute, is invalid for any reason, and the statute so found
invalid has expressly or by necessary implication repealed another statute or provision upon
the same subject, so much of the former statute
which was superseded by the invalid portion of
the later one is not repealed, but continues in
full force and effect. Board of Educ. v. Hunter,
48 Utah 373, 159 P. 1019 (1916).
Municipal ordinances.
This section has no application to municipal
ordinances, or to any proceeding instituted under them. Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41
Utah 154, 125 P. 389 (1912).
Repeal by later laws in conflict.
When one act states that certain conduct is
unlawful and a subsequent act says unqualifiedly that the same conduct shall not be unlawful, there is an irreconcilable conflict resulting in an absolute repeal, even if there had
been no repealing clause attached thereto. Repeal of the later act would not revive the former law. Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County,
72 Utah 405, 270 P. 543 (1928).
-Exception.
This section is not applicable where a statute
is in effect a proviso or an exception to the pro-

visions of a previous statute, and the subsequent statute is repealed, for in such case the
previous statute remains in full force and effect. Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County, 72
Utah 405, 270 P. 543 (1928).

Repealed provisions considered in construction of statutes.
General rule is that repealed part of act, although of no operating force, must be considered in construing unrepealed part thereof. In
other words, propriety of comparing repealed
statutes with statutes remaining in force, or
subsequently enacted, for purpose of construing latter, is not to be questioned in absence of
any reference to repealed statutes in statutes
under consideration. Ogden City v. Boreman,
20 Utah 98, 57 P. 843 (1899).
Repeals by implication.
Where a subsequent statute is so repugnant
to a former one that the two cannot be construed reasonably together the former statute
is repealed by implication. Bartch v. Meloy, 8
Utah 424, 32 P. 694 (1893).
One act does not impliedly repeal another if
by reasonable construction the two acts can be
harmonized and made to stand together.
Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524, 77
Am. St. R. 917 (1899); University of Utah v.
Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P. 96, 77 Am. St. R.
928 (1899); Park v. Rives, 40 Utah 47, 119 P.
1034 (1911).
Repeals by implication are not favored by
law. University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
457, 59 P. 96, 77 Am. St. R. 928 (1899).
Unintentional repeal.
If a statute was unintentionally or inadvertently repealed, the remedy is not with the
courts but by legislative action. Lagoon Jockey
Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405, 270 P. 543
(1928).
Water rights.
This section would apply to abrogation of
water rights. Bacon v. Harris, 71 Utah 223,
263 P. 930 (1928).
Cited in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 <Utah
1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Comment, The Liability Reform Act: An Approach
to Equitable Application, 13 J. Contemp. L. 89
(1987).
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68-3-6. Identical provisions
new enactment.

deemed a continuation,
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not

The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as those of any
prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of such provisions, and not
as a new enactment.
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 88-2-6.

Cross-References. - Effect of 1933 revision on limitation of actions, § 68-2-7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ment. State v. Roberts, 56 Utah 136, 190 P. 351
(1911).

ANALYSIS

Reenactment of statutes.
-Statutes
of limitation.
Reenactment of statutes.
Court must assume that by reenacting statutes Legislature was satisfied with construction court placed upon statute before reenact-

-Statutes
of limitation.
Reenactment of statutes of limitation by
1933 revision amounted not to a repeal of the
antecedent sections, but to a reaffirmation
thereof. Attorney Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah
426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114 A.L.R. 726 (1937).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 322.

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 276, 370.
Key Numbers. - Statutes ea> 147, 223.5.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

68-3-7. Time, how computed.
The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by
excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and
then it also is excluded.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2493;
C.L. 1917, § 5843; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-7.
Cross-References. - Computation of time,
Rule 6(a), U.R.C.P.
Election title, Sundays included in time computations, § 20A-1-401.

Enlargement of time for doing an act, Rule
6(bl, U.R.C.P.
Holidays, § 63-13-2.
Juvenile Court Act, time to be computed in
accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure,
§ 78-3a-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Bills of exceptions.
Certain system of time.
Directory nature of provision.
-Public officers.
Election laws.
Grace period in insurance contract.
Judicial notice.
Notice of appeal.
Pleadings.
Pre-existing law.
Publication of notices.
Statute of limitations.

-Tolling.
In general.
Where statute requires or permits act to be
done within stated number of days from or after a designated day, it is timely if done on the
last day of the stated number; but where statute prescribes period within which act may not
be done as not less than a certain number of
days before designated day, act must be done
without such period and cannot be performed
on any day within such period, both designated
day and most remote day within period being
excluded as days on which act may be done.
Wood v. Cowan, 68 Utah 388, 250 P. 979
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(1926); Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 265, 130
P.2d 278, 143 A.L.R. 987 (1942).

Bills of exceptions.
This section was applied in determining
whether thirty-day period prescribed by former
§ 104-39-4, Code 1943, had expired before application was made for extension of time under
former § 104-42-7, Code 1943. Independent
Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71 Utah
348, 266 P. 267 (1928).
Certain system of time.
The courts will take judicial notice of the fact
that a certain system of time is in use, such as
war time, or daylight saving time, and when
time is a material ingredient, at least so far as
laws are concerned, courts should apply the
time in general use, and not that which by
common consent has been discarded and has
thus become obsolete. Anderson v. Cook, 102
Utah 265, 130 P.2d 278, 143 A.L.R. 987 (1942).
Directory nature of provision.
Specification in statute of time for doing of
act should be held directory only when doing of
act at another time is not forbidden, unless doing of it at another time would unjustly affect
private or public interests. Nelson v. Southern
Pac. Co., 18 Utah 244, 55 P. 364 (1898).
-Public
officers.
General rule is that, where statute impoi;es
on public officers duty of performing some act
in which public is interested and fixes time for
doing such act, requirement as to time is to be
regarded as directory and not limitation on exercise of power granted, unless statute contains negative words denying right to exercise
power after time named or, from character of
act, manner and mode of its performance, or its
effect on public interests or private rights, it
must be presumed that Legislature had in contemplation that act had better not be performed at all than to be performed at time
other than that designated. Kennedy v. Oregon
Short Line R.R., 18 Utah 325, 54 P. 988 (1898).
Election laws.
Where filing is to be made under Primary
Election Law "not less than fifteen day3 before
election," both election day and fifteenth day
before election, counting day immediately preceding election as first, must be excluded in
determining timeliness. Wood v. Cowan, 68
Utah 388, 250 P. 979 (1926); Anderson v. Cook,
102 Utah 265, 130 P.2d 278, 143 A.L.R. 987
(1942).
Grace period in insurance contract.
Where a fraternal benefit society certificate
requires payment in advance of monthly premiums and provides that all periods of insurance shall begin and end at twelve o'clock noon
of the last day of month beginning March 31,
1951, and also provided for a 31-day grace pe-

riod, the grace period is measured from noon of
the last day of the preceding month and not
from the next day after the lapse of the policy.
To apply this section would clearly be against
the intent of the parties, since then, for onehalf day between the termination of the period
of insurance and the beginning of the grace
period the insured would not be covered.
Cooper v. Foresters' Underwriters, 2 Utah 2d
373, 275 P.2d 675 (1954).

Judicial notice.
In making the computation prescribed by
this section Supreme Court may take judicial
notice that a certain date foll on Sunday.
Thompson v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Utah 212,
273 P. 311 (1929).
Notice of appeal.
Where motion for new trial was overruled on
June 5, 1916,judgment became final, and time
for appeal began to run on that date, and notice
of appeal served December 6, 1916 was not
timely within former § 104-41-2, Code 1943.
Fuller v. Ferrin, 51 Utah 105, 168 P. 1179
(1917).
Pleadings.
This section has been applied to the computation of the time in which a defendant must
appear and answer a summons issued out of
justices' court. Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah
363, 10 P. 427 (1886).
In view of this provision, excluding first day
and also the last on which an act may be done
when last day falls on holiday, complaint filed
one day after expiration of limitation period
under former § 104-2-21, Code 1943, was
timely where previous day was Sunday. Nelson
v. Jorgenson, 66 Utah 360, 242 P. 945 (1926).
Pre-existing law.
This section is largely declaratory of pre-existing Jaw. Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co.,
28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758, 107 Am. St. R. 689
(1904); I.X.L. Furn. & Carpet Installment
House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279 (1907).
Publication of notices.
Section was applicable to publication of notice of intention to make local improvements
under former§ 10-7-41. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v.
Payson City, 66 Utah 521, 244 P. 138 (1926).
This section was applied to the ten-day notice provided for by § 75-14-1, since repealed.
Pearson v. Butler, 79 Utah 583, 11 P.2d 972
(1932).
Statute of limitations.
-Tolling.
Where defendant claimed that only the days
he was absent from the state for the entire day
should toll the statute of limitations, but the
trial judge computed the days by excluding the
day defendant left the state on each separate
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occasion but including the day he returned and
then added these absences together and found
that defendant had been absent for ninety-six
days, it was held that the trial judge correctly

68-3-9

calculated defendant's absences for the purpose
of tolling the statute of limitations. Van
Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 <Utah Ct. App.
1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -

§§ 371 to 373.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Time §§ 13, 14.
A.L.R. - What twelve-month period consti-
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tutes "year" or "calendar year" as used in public enactment, contract, or other written instrument, 5 A.L.R.3d 584.
Key Numbers. - Time eao 9, 10.

When a day appointed is a holiday.

Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a work of necessity or
mercy, is appointed by law or contract to be performed upon a particular day,
which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be performed upon the next
succeeding business day with the same effect as if it had been performed upon
the day appointed.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2494;
C.L. 1917, § 5844; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-8.
Cross-References. - Commercial paper,
time allowed for acceptance or payment,
§ 70A-3-506.

Filing date falling on Saturday, Sunday or
holiday, § 63-37-3.
Holidays, § 63-13-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
and valid. Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver
& R.G.R.R., 59 Utah 266, 203 P. 863 (192ll.

ANALYSIS

Bill of exceptions.
Complaint.

Bill of exceptions.
Where time to serve bill of exceptions was
extended and last day to which extension was
made fell on Sunday, an order granting further
extension on Monday following was in time

Complaint.
In view of this provision and § 68-3-7, complaint is timely though filed one day after expiration of limitation period, where previous day
was Sunday. Nelson v. Jorgenson, 66 Utah
360, 242 P. 945 (1926).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 73 Am. Jur. 2d Sundays and
Holiday § 70 et seq.
A.L.R. - Service of summons or complaint
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on Sunday or holiday, validity of, 63 A.L.R.3d
423.
Key Numbers. - Holidays eao 4 to 6.

Seal, how affixed.

When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law to be affixed to
any paper, the word "seal" includes an impression of such seal upon the paper
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the
word "seal" may include a scroll printed or written.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2495;
C.L. 1917, § 5845; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-9.
Cross-References. - Great seal of the

State of Utah, Utah Const., Art. VII, Sec. 20;
§ 67-la-8.
Municipal seals, § 10-1-202.
Seals of courts, §§ 78-7-14, 78-7-15.
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C.J.S. - 79 C.J.S. Seals
Key Numbers. - Seals

=3.3.
§

68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority.
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers, or other
persons, are to be construed as giving such authority to a majority of them,
unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2496;
C.L. 1917, § 5846; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-10.

Cross-References. - Personal representatives, majority concurrence required unless
will provides otherwise, § 75-3-716.

68-3-11. Rules of construction

as to words and phrases.

Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497;
C.L. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-11.

Cross-References. - Duty of court to construe statutes, § 78-21-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Court's duty.
Forfeiture.
Implied meaning.
Meaning of word "may."
Supplying omissions.
Title of act.
Use of same language.
-In same statute.
-In different statutes.
Construction and application.
Where there is doubt respecting true meaning of certain words, then words should be read
in light of conditions and necessities which
they are intended to meet and objects sought to
be attained thereby. United States Smelting,
Ref. & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902 (1921).
Presumption is that words are used in their
ordinary sense and if a different interpretation
is sought it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context
which will justify a different meaning. Deseret
Sav. Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85,217 P. 1114
(1923).
Unless technical terms are used, words employed in statute must be given their usual and

ordinary meaning. Cache Auto Co. v. Central
Garage, 63 Utah 10,221 P. 862, 30 A.L.R.1217
(1923).
Meaning of words found in statute must be
determined from general context of the same
and the intent or object sought to be accomplished by the legislation, and courts in attempting to arrive at the intent of the Legislature will disregard mere forms and look to the
substance. State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226
P. 674 (1924).
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage
of the language; except in case of technical
words and phrases, they must be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning,
but technical rules of construction may be disregarded where it is manifest, when the subject
of legislation, considered from all points of
view, is such as to convince the understanding
that the Legislature could not have intended a
literal interpretation. State v. Hendrickson, 67
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 0926).
This section is merely declaratory of pre-existing rules of statutory construction. State v.
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
Definition of word may depend upon the
character of its use in a statute. State v.
Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
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Unless contrary appears, terms of legislative
enactment must be taken in their ordinary and
usual significance as they are generally understood. Emmertson v. State Tax Comm'n, 93
Utah 219, 72 P.2d 467, 113 A.L.R. 1174 (1937).

Court's duty.
In construction of statutes it is duty of courts
to ascertain intent of legislative body, and in
determining this intent, not only should language of act be considered, but also purposes
and objects sought by Legislature, and if legislation is within constitutional power, to enforce such intent. Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156,
258 P. 1016 (1927).
It is court's duty, when possible, to give to
every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of
statute a consistent, reasonable meaning. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
(1927).
Forfeiture.
It is duty of courts to enforce plain intent of
statute, but courts ought not to construe an act
to effect the forfeiture of property of one citizen
to another, unless "plain and unequivocal
mandate of the Legislature admits of no other
rational construction." Rospigliosi v. Glenallen
Mining Co., 69 Utah 41, 252 P. 276 (1926).
Implied meaning.
In applying this section to the construction of
word "maintain," the court said that that
which is contained in statute by implication is
as much part of statute as that which expressly
appears therein.
Meaning of word "may."
Word "may" as used in§ 78-56-10, providing
that judge of city court "may" employ shorthand reporter upon request of any party,
should be construed as discretionary, not mandatory. Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah 467, 195 P.
547 (1921).
Supplying omissions.
In construing statutes court may supply
manifest omissions in order to avoid absurd

68-3-11

and mischievous consequences and to effect
legislative intent. Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 69 Utah 521, 256 P. 790
(1927).
Court may inquire into purpose sought to be
accomplished in order to supply missing words
of statute, and words that are obviously necessary to complete sense will be supplied to effect
a meaning clearly shown by other parts of statute. Chez ex rel. Weber College v. Utah State
Bldg. Comm'n, 93 Utah 538, 74 P.2d 687
(1937).

Title of act.
While it is true that the title is not integrated into the operating portion oflegislation,
and that it will not be permitted to contradict
or defeat a plainly expressed intent, and that
the title cannot be used to create an ambiguity
or uncertainty when the language in the body
of the act is clear, nevertheless, if clarity is
lacking in the language of an enactment, the
title may be considered to shed light upon and
clarify the meaning. Great Salt Lake Auth. v.
Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d
963 (1966).
Use of same language.
-In same statute.
Word repeatedly used in statute will be presumed to bear same meaning throughout statute, unless there is something to show that another meaning was intended. Merrill v. Spencer, 14 Utah 273, 46 P. 1096 (1896); State v.
Tingey, 24 Utah 225, 67 P. 33 (1902).
-In different statutes.
The same words, especially if found in different statutes, may not always have the same
effect, and it follows that in order to determine
intention and purpose oflawmaker, and to harmonize conflicting provisions, it at times becomes necessary for courts to expand or to restrict ordinary and usual meaning of words,
phrases, or clauses found in particular section
or statute. Board of Educ. v. Bryner, 57 Utah
78, 192 P. 627 (1920).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
§§ 204, 225 to 227, 238, 250. (construing usury
statute).

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes§§ 314,315,329,
330, 348.
Key Numbers. - Statutes e,,, 178, 179, 188,
192, 208.
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Rules of construction.

(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following general rules shall be
observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(a) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular.
(b) Words used in one gender comprehend the other.
(c) Words used in the present tense include the future.
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the following definitions shall be
observed, unless the definition would be inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means:
(i) all actions by a board, commission, department, officer, or other
administrative unit of the state that determine the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more
identifiable persons, including all actio'ls to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and
(ii) judicial review of all such actions.
(b) "Councilman" includes a town trustee or a city commissioner, and
"city commissioner" includes a councilman.
(c) "County executive" means:
(i) the county commission in the traditional management arrangement established by Section 17-4-2 and Title 17, Chapter 5;
(ii) the county executive in the "county executive and chief administrative officer-council" optional form of management arrangement
authorized by Section 17-35a-13;
(iii) the county executive in the "county executive-council" optional form of management arrangement authorized by Section
17-35a-14;
(iv) the county manager in the "council-manager" optional form of
management arrangement authorized by Section 17-35a-15; and
(v) the county council in the "council-county administrative officer" optional form of management arrangement authorized by Section 17-35a-15.5.
(d) "County legislative body" means:
(i) the county commission in the traditional management arrangement established by Section 17-4-2 and Title 17, Chapter 5;
(ii) the county council in the "county executive and chief administrative officer-council" optional form of management arrangement
authorized by Section 17-35a-13;
(iii) the county council in the "county executive-council" optional
form of management arrangement authorized by Section 17-35a-14;
(iv) the county council in the "council-manager" optional form of
management arrangement authorized by Section 17-35a-15; and
(v) the county council in the "council-county administrative officer" optional form of management arrangement authorized by Section 17-35a-15.5.
(e) "Executor" includes administrator, and the term "administrator"
includes executor, when the subject matter justifies such use.
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(f) "Guardian" includes a person who has qualified as a guardian of a
minor or incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment and a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a
minor or incapacitated person.
(g) "Highway" and "road" include public bridges, and may be held
equivalent to the words "county way," "county road," "common road," and
"state road."
(h) "Him," "his," and other masculine pronouns include "her," "hers,"
and similar feminine pronouns unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intent or the subject matter relates clearly and necessarily to the
male sex only.
(i) "Insane person" include idiots, lunatics, distracted persons, and persons of unsound mind.
(j) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements,
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims.
(k) "Man" or "men" when used alone or in conjunction with other syllables as in "workman," includes "woman" or "women" unless the context
clearly indicates a contrary intent or the subject matter relates clearly
and necessarily to the male sex only.
(1) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and
the word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expression "year of our Lord."
(m) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "affirm." Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the
term "testify," and every written one, in the term "depose."
(n) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies.
(o) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods,
chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written instruments
by which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to property is created,
acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every right or interest therein.
(p) "Personal representative," "executor," and "administrator" includes
an executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function
under the law governing their status.
(q) "Population" shall be as shown by the last preceding state or national census, unless otherwise specially provided.
(r) "Property" includes both real and personal property.
(s) "Sheriff," "county attorney," "district attorney," "clerk," or other
wor<ls used to denote an executive or ministerial officer, may include any
deputy, or other person performing the duties of such officer, either generally or in special cases; and the words "county clerk" may be held to
include "clerk of the district court."
(t) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the intent to authenticate any instrument or writing.
(u) "State," when applied to the different parts of the United States,
includes the District of Columbia and the territories; and the words
"United States" may include the District and the territories.
(v) "Town" may mean incorporated town and may include city, and the
word "city" may mean incorporated town.
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(w) "Vessel," when used with reference to shipping, includes steamboats, canal boats, and every structure adapted to be navigated from
place to place.
(x) "Will" includes codicils.
(y) "Writ" means an order or precept in writing, issued in the name of
the state or of a court or judicial officer; and "process" means a writ or
summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings.
(z) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and typewriting.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2498; L. 1907, ch. 72,
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 2498; C.L.1917, § 5848; R.S.

1933 & C. 1943, 88-2-12; L. 1977, ch. 194,

§ 72; 1977, ch. 266, § l; 1985, ch. 21, § 45;
1987, ch. 161, § 286; 1993, ch. 38, § 76; 1993,
ch. 227, § 383.

Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment by ch. 38, effective May 3, 1993, inserted
'"district attorney"' in the definition of "sheriff."
The 1993 amendment by ch. 227, effective
May 3, 1993, added Subsections (2)(c) and (d)
and made corresponding designation changes.

This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislature Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. - Some of the subsections of this section were taken from the Civil
Practice Act of 1870 (Comp. Laws 1876,
§ 1815). It is substantially similar to 2 Comp.
Laws 1888, § 2997, which, however, only included seven subsections.
Cross-References. - Oath, affirmation in
lieu of, § 78-24-18; Rules of Evidence, Rule
603.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
deed. Lavagnino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah 1, 71 P.
1046, 99 Am. St. R. 808 (1903), affd, 198 U.S.
443, 25 S. Ct. 716, 49 L. Ed. 1119 (1905).
It is doubtful that the term "possessory
right" as used in the general statute defining
real estate was intended to mean the type of
right to possession one acquires under rental or
lease. Woolley v. Wycoff, 2 Utah 2d 329, 273
P.2d 181 (1954).

ANALYSIS

Gender.
Insane person.
Land, real estate, and real property.
Sheriff, county attorney, or clerk.
Signature.
Singular includes plural.
Town.
Writing.
Gender.
This section was held to warrant a holding
that the word "horse" embraced both "mare"
and "gelding." People v. Butler, 2 Utah 504
(1880).
Term "he" includes females. Chatwin v.
Terry, 107 Utah 340, 153 P.2d 941 (1944).
Section did not compel court to construe statute concerning revocation of will executed by a
man upon his subsequent marriage to apply
also to will executed by a woman prior to her
marriage; prior will executed by woman was
not revoked by her subsequent marriage. Estate of Armstrong v. Logan, 21 Utah 2d 86, 440
P.2d 881 (1968).
Insane person.
This provision was not in conflict with provisions of guardianship Jaw relating to the appointment of guardians for insane persons and
defining the words "incompetent," "mentally
incompetent" and "incapable." In re Lamont's
Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P.2d 649 (1938).
Land, real estate, and real property.
Mining claims are real property and pass by

Sheriff, county attorney, or clerk.
Deputy treasurer was officer within meaning
of statutory provision, providing for punishment for misuse of public money. McMillin v.
Emery, 59 Utah 553, 205 P. 898 (1922).
Defendant who was employed as deputy city
recorder but who also had additional duties including the receipt of money for parking meter
fines, various licenses, taxes and funds and
fees pertaining to city cemetery was an officer
and thereby properly charged for embezzling
city funds, since under this section, a deputy or
other person performing duties of the officer is
included in words denoting an executive or
ministerial officer. State v. Ahrens, 25 Utah 2d
222, 479 P.2d 786 (1971).
Signature.
Purported holographic will consisting of
three handwritten index cards Jacked the requisite authenticating signature, where there
was no evidence that decedent's name in the
introductory clause on one card was written
with the intent that it constitute authentication of one or all of the cards as a will. Estate of
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Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), aft'd, 806 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1991).
A "signature" is essential to a valid holographic will, and a written name is a "signature" only if it is made with "the intent to authenticate" the will. In re Estate of Erickson,
806 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1991).

Singular includes plural.
Statute giving authority to ask witness
about fact of previous conviction of "felony"
construed to authorize questions as to more
than one prior conviction. State v. Kazda, 14
Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963).
Town.
Word "city" in statute giving state board authority to invest state school funds in bonds of

68-3-13

city could mean "incorporated town," and
hence land board could invest in bonds of incorporated towns. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs v.
Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 P. 59 (1911).

Writing.
Typewritten endorsement of check complied
with statutory requirement that endorsement
be written on instrument. Pingree Nat'l Bank
v. McFarland, 57 Utah 410, 195 P. 313 (1921).
Where statute permits charging of fees only
for words "actually written therein," if printed
forms are used in recording, county recorder
cannot change filing fee for all words in form,
notwithstanding provision of this section that
word "writing" includes printing. First Sav.
Bank v. Bramwell, 67 Utah 341, 247 P. 573
(1926).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

§§ 219 to 221, 225 to 227, 248.

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes§§ 314, 315,337,
338.
A.L.R. - What twelve-month period constitutes "year" or "calendar year" as used in public enactment, contract or other written instrument, 5 A.L.R.3d 584.

What constitutes "property" obtained within
extortion statute, 67 A.L.R.3d 1021.
Term "money" or "moneys" in will as including real property, 76 A.L.R.3d 1254.
Mine tailings as real or personal property, 75
A.L.R.4th 965.
Key Numbers. - Statutes e=, 178, 179, 198,
199.

68-3-13. Printing boldface in numbered bills - Purpose Effect - Power of Office of Legislative Research
and General Counsel to change.
A short summary of each section, part, chapter, or title, called boldface, may
be printed in numbered bills introduced in the Legislature. This boldface is
not law; it is intended only to highlight the content of each section, part,
chapter, or title for legislators. Inaccurate boldface is not a basis for invalidating legislation. The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel is
authorized in Section 36-12-12 to change the boldface in the enrolling process
so that it more accurately reflects the substance of each section, part, chapter,
or title.
History: C. 1953, 68-3-13, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 16, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1989, ch. 16 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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CHAPTER 4
UTAH COMMISSION ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS
Section
68-4-1 to 68-4-4. Repealed.
68-4-5.
Creation - Members General counsel.
68-4-6.
Vacancies.
68-4-7. Meetings - Officers.

68-4-1 to 68-4-4.

Section
68-4-8.
68-4-9.

Terms -

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 68-4-1 tu 68-4-4 (L.
1907, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 4; C.L. 1907, §§ 2723 to
2723x3; C.L. 1917, §§ 6180 to 6183; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 97-0-1 to 97-0-4; L. 1955, ch. 141,
§ 1), relating to the Board of Commissioners

68-4-5.

Duties of commissioners.
Expenditures - Oversight by Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.

for the Promotion of Uniformity of Legislation
in the Urited States, were repealed by Laws
1957, ch. 155, § 7. For present comparable provisions, see § 68-4-5 et seq.

Creation - Members - Terms - General counsel.

(1) The "Utah Commission on Uniform State Laws" consists of four members of the Utah bar in good standing, one of whom shall be a member of the
Legislature at the time of the appointment and during his service on the
commission.
(2) Three commissioners shall be appointed by the governor by and with
the consent of the Senate. The commissioners shall serve six-year terms commencing on July 1 of the year of appointment, and may be reappointed for
subsequent six-year terms by the governor. Each commissioner shall serve
until his successor is appointed.
(3) The fourth commissioner shall be the Legislature's general counsel who
shall serve during the appointment as general counsel. The Legislature's general counsel may appoint a designee from the Office of Legislative Research
and General Counsel to serve in his stead. The designee shall serve at the will
of the Legislature's general counsel.
History: L. 1957, ch. 155, § 1; 1987, ch.
193, § 1; 1993, ch. 125, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, deleted language
creating the commission from the beginning of
Subsection (1) and added "and during his service on the commission" to the end; in Subsection (2), deleted the terms of appointment for
the commissioners, inserted "commencing on
July 1 of the year of appointment," and added

the last sentence; substituted "fourth" for
"other" and all the language beginning "who
shall serve" for "or the designee of the legislative general counsel" in Subsection (3); and
made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Appointive power of
governor, Utah Const., Art. VII, Sec. 10.
Membership of Utah State Bar, § 78-51-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§§ 32, 338 to 341.

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 2.
Key Numbers. - Statutes e=> 2.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
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Vacancies.

(1) Upon the death, resignation, failure, or refusal to serve of the commissioners appointed under Subsection 68-4-6(2), or if the legislative member
ceases to be a member of the Legislature, his office becomes vacant; and the
governor shall, by and with the consent of the Senate, make an appointment
to fill the vacancy, such appointment to be for the unexpired term of the
commissioner creating the vacancy.
(2) The commissioner who is the Legislature's general counsel or designee
shall serve only during that appointment as the Legislature's general counsel.
History: L. 1957, ch. 155, § 2; 1993, ch.
125, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, deleted the former
first three sentences, defining terms of appointment, inserted the Subsection (1) designation, substituted the language beginning "the

68-4-7.

Meetings -

commissioners appointed" and continuing to
"of the Legislature" for "any commissioner" in
Subsection (ll, added Subsection (2), and made
stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Power of governor to
fill certain vacancies, Utah Const., Art. VII,
Sec. 9.

Officers.

The commissioners shall meet at least once each year and shall organize by
the election of one of their number as chairman and another as secretary, who
shall hold their respective offices for a term of two years and until their
successors are elected. The chairman and secretary may be reelected for additional terms.
History: L. 1957, ch. 155, § 3; 1993, ch.
125, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amend-

68-4-8.

ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "each
year" for "in two years" and added the second
sentence.

Duties of commissioners.

(1) The members of the commission shall:

(a) examine the subjects upon which uniformity of legislation in the
various states of the union is desirable but that are outside the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United States;
(b) confer upon these matters with the commissioners appointed by
other states for the same purpose;
(c) at the direction of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, serve on national committees that draft uniform and
model laws; and
(d) devise and recommend other means to accomplish the purposes of
this chapter.
(2) The commission may request a legislator to sponsor, as an item on the
interim study resolution, or as a bill for introduction, any uniform legislation
that the commission determines would be in the best interests of the state to
adopt.
History: L. 1957, ch. 155, § 4; 1987, ch.
193, § 2; 1993, ch. 125, § 4.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "may"

for "shall" and inserted "or as a bill for introduction" in Subsection (2).
Cross-References. - For a complete list of
uniform laws incorporated into the Utah Code,
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see the heading "Uniform Laws" in the General Index.
Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers, Title 22, Chapter 5.
Uniform Act on Paternity, Title 78, Chapter
45a.
Uniform Commercial Code, Title 70A.
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Title 77,
Chapter 30.
Uniform Division oflncome for Tax Purposes
Act, §§ 59-7-301 to 59-7-321.
Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Counties,
Title 17, Chapter 36.
Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities, Title 10, Chapter 6.

Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah
Towns, Title 10, Chapter 5.
Uniform Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act, Title 57, Chapter 11.
Uniform Probate Code, Title 75.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, Title 77, Chapter 31.
Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as Witnesses
in Criminal Proceedings Act, Title 77, Chapter
33.
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, Title 78,
Chapter 44.
Utah Uniform Securities Act, Title 61, Chapter 1.

68-4-9. Expenditures - Oversight by Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel.
(1) No member of the commission may receive any compensation for that
member's services. However, each member shall receive a per diem and shall
be paid the actual traveling and other necessary expenses incurred in the
discharge of the commissioner's official duties.
(2) The Legislature shall make appropriations to the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel to pay the necessary expenses of the commissioners and to make appropriate contribution on behalf of this state to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
(3) The commissioners shall keep a full account of their expenditures in the
discharge of their official duties and shall report the account to the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel.
History: L. 1957, ch. 155, § 5; 1983, ch.
320, § 82; 1987, ch. 193, § 3.

Cross-References. - Per diem rates and
travel expenses, §§ 63A-l-106, 63A-1-107.
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TITLE 69
TELEGRAPHIC AND TELEPHONIC
TRANSACTIONS
Chapter
1. General Provisions.
2. Emergency Telephone Service Law.
3. Telecommunication Towers and Related Facilities.
4. Telecommunication Network Review.

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section
69-1-1.
69-1-2.

69-1-1.

j
'

Notice by, authorized.
Transmitting written instruments
by telegraph or telephone authorized - Entitled to record - Force
and effect of copies - Documents
submitted to recorder - Requirements.

Section
69-1-3.
69-1-4.

Transmitting agreements for payment of money - Burden of proof.
Transmitting certified instruments
- Burden of proof.

Notice by, authorized.

Whenever any notice, information or intelligence is required to be given the
same may be given by telegraph or telephone. Any such notice, information or
intelligence shall be delivered to the telegraph or telephone operator in writing and shall be delivered to the person for whom it is intended in writing by
the operator at the receiving office, who shall, on request, certify thereon that
the writing so delivered is a true copy of the original. Notice by telegraph or
telephone shall be deemed actual notice.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2697; L. 1907, ch. 21,

§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 2697; C.L. 1917, § 6117; R.S.

1933 & C. 1943, 92-0-1.

Cross-References. - Service of process by
telegraph or telephone, Rule 4, U.R.C.P.
Telegraph or telephone authorization of execution of arrest warrant, § 77-7-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Notice of appeal.
Under this section, notice of appeal could be
served by telegraph notice to clerk of trial
court. The clerk would file the telegraph copy

and then file the original notice. Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P.
161 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice§ 37.
C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S. Notice § 18.
A.L.R. - Presumption of addressee's receipt
of telegram, applicability and application, in
civil case of, 24 A.L.R.3d 1434.

Key Numbers. - Notice
64.
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Transmitting written instruments by telegraph or
telephone authorized - Entitled to record
Force and effect of copies - Documents submitted to recorder - Requirements.
'

Any power of attorney or other instrument in writing duly proved or acknowledged and certified so as to be entitled to record may, together with the
certificate of its proof or acknowledgment, be sent by telegraph or telephone,
and the telegraphic or telephonic copy shall prima facie have the same force
and effect in all respects, and may be admitted to record and recorded in the
same manner and with the same effect, as the original. Documents submitted
to the county recorder for recording shall be original or certified copies from
other offices of public record, as required by Title 57.
History: R.S. 1898, § 2698; L. 1907, ch. 21,
l;C.L. 1907,§ 2698;C.L.1917,§ 6118;R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 92-0-2; L. 1989, ch. 91, § l;
1990, ch. 93, § 30.
Amendment Notes. - The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added the requirement that documents submitted to county
recorders be original or certified copies from
other offices of public records.
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
§

1990, divided the section into two sentences by
deleting "but" and making a punctuation and a
capitalization change.
Cross-References. - Admissibility of writings and recordings, Rules 1001 to 1003,
U.R.E.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Proof of authorship or identity of
sender of telegram as prerequisite of its admission in evidence, 5 A.L.R.3d 1018.

69-1-3.

Transmitting agreements for payment of money Burden of proof.

Checks, due bills, promissory notes, bills of exchange and all orders or
agreements for the payment or delivery of money or other thing of value may
be made or drawn by telegraph, and when so made or drawn shall have the
same force and effect to charge the maker, drawer, endorser or acceptor
thereof, and shall create the same rights and equities in favor of the payee,
drawee, endorsee, acceptor, holder or bearer thereof, as if duly made or drawn
and delivered in writing. Except as in the next succeeding section [Section
69-1-4] otherwise provided, whenever the genuineness or execution of any
such instrument received by telegraph shall be denied on oath by or on behalf
of the person sought to be charged thereby it shall be incumbent upon the
party claiming under or alleging the existence of the same to prove the existence and execution of the original writing from which the telegraphic copy
was transmitted. The original message shall in all cases be preserved in the
telegraph office from which the same is sent.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2699;
C.L. 1917, § 6119; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
92-0-3.
Cross-References. - Admissibility of writ-

ings and recordings, Rules 1001 to 1003,
U.R.E.
Contracts by telegraph deemed in writing
under statute of frauds, § 25-5-7.
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69-1-4. Transmitting
. proof.

certified instruments

69-2-2

Burden of

Except as hereinbefore otherwise provided, any instrument in writing, duly
certified under his hand and official seal by a notary public, commissioner of
deeds or clerk of a court of record to be genuine to the personal knowledge of
such officer, may, together with such certificate, be sent by telegraph or telephone. The telegraphic or telephonic copy thereof shall, prima facie only, have
the same force, effect and validity in all respects as the original, and the
burden of proof shall be on the party denying the genuineness or due execution of the original.
History: R.S. 1898,

§

2700; L. 1907, ch. 21,

§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 2700; C.L. 1917, § 6120; R.S.

1933 & C. 1943, 92-0-4.

Cross-References. - Admissibility of writings and recordings, Rules 1001 to 1003,
U.R.E.

CHAPTER 2
EMERGENCY TELEPHONE SERVICE
LAW
Section
69-2-1.
69-2-2.
69-2-3.
69-2-4.
69-2-5.

Section
69-2-6.

Short title.
Definitions.
911 service - Establishment.
Administration.
Funding.

69-2-7.
69-2-8.

Jurisdiction and employee immunity.
Limitation of liabilities.
Liabilities of providers.

69-2-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Emergency Telephone Service Law."
History: C. 1953, 69-2-1, enacted
1986, ch. 33, § 1.

by L.

Cross-References. - Emergency medical
services, Title 26, Chapter 8.

69-2-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Basic local exchange access line" means the local exchange access
line provided to a residence or business customer for basic telephone
service except access lines provided for the provision of public coin telephone service.
(2) "911 emergency telephone service" means a communication system
which provides citizens with rapid direct access to public emergency operation centers by dialing the telephone number "911" with the objective of
reducing the response time to situations requiring law enforcement, fire,
medical, rescue, and other emergency services.
(3) "Public agency" means any county, city, town, special service district, or public authority located within the state which provides or has
authority to provide fire fighting, law enforcement, ambulance, medical,
or other emergency services.

355

69-2-3

TELEGRAPHIC AND TELEPHONIC TRANSACTIONS

(4) "Public safety agency" means a functional division of a public
agency which provides fire fighting, law enforcement, medical, or other
emergency services.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 33, § I.

69-2-3. 911 service -

Establishment.

The governing authority of any public agency may establish a 911 emergency telephone service to provide service to any part or all of the territory
lying within the geographical area of such public agency and may join with
the governing authority of any other public agency to provide emergency
telephone service to any part or all of the territory lying within their respective jurisdictions. A county may provide 911 emergency telephone service
within other public safety agency jurisdictions only upon agreement with the
governing authority of such public safety agency.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 33, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Admissibility of tape recording or
transcript of "911" emergency telephone call, 3
A.L.R.5th 784.

69-2-4. Administration.
The administration of the 911 emergency telephone system shall be provided by the governing authority of the public agency establishing 911 emergency telephone service either directly or by the appointment of employees of
the public agency as directed by the governing authority, except that any 911
emergency telephone service established by a special service district shall be
administered as set forth in Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 13.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 33, § 1; 1992, ch. 30, § 145.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amend-

ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted the
present code citation at the end of the section
for "Chapter 23, Title 11."

69-2-5. Funding.
(1) In providing funding of 911 emergency telephone service, any public
agency establishing a 911 emergency telephone service may:
(a) seek assistance from the federal or state government, to the extent
constitutionally permissible, in the form ofloans, advances, grants, subsidies, and otherwise, directly or indirectly;
(b) seek funds appropriated by state and county taxing authorities for
the funding of public safety agencies; and
(c) seek gifts, donations, or grants from individuals, corporations, and
other public and governmental agencies.
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(2) For purposes of providing funding of 911 emergency telephone service,
special service districts may raise funds as provided in Section 11-23-14 and
may borrow money and incur indebtedness as provided in Section 11-23-15.
(3) The governing authority of any public agency providing 911 emergency
telephone service may levy annually an emergency telephone charge in an
amount not to exceed 50 cents per month on each basic local exchange access
line. Notification of intent shall be given to the public service commission at
least 30 days prior to the effective date.
(4) All monies received by the public agency for the provision of 911 emergency telephone service shall be paid over to the appropriate financial officer
of the public agency and by him deposited in a special emergency telephone
service fund. All monies in the emergency telephone service fund shall be
expended by the public agency to pay the costs of establishing, installing,
maintaining, and operating a 911 emergency telephone system or integrating
a 911 system into an established public safety dispatch center, including contracting with the providers of local exchange telephone service and vendors of
appropriate terminal equipment as necessary to implement the 911 emergency telephone service. Revenues derived for the funding of 911 emergency
telephone service may only be used for that portion of costs related to the
operation of the 911 emergency telephone system when such a system is
integrated with any public safety dispatch system.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 33, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - Sections 11-23-14 and
11-23-15, cited in Subsection (2), were, respectively, repealed in 1989 and renumbered in
1990 as § 17A-2-1316.

69-2-6.

Jurisdiction

Cross-References. - Authority of Public
Service Commission of Utah, Title 54, Chapter
4.

and employee

immunity.

In implementing a 911 emergency telephone service, the public agency and
public safety agencies and their employees shall cooperate in establishing the
service and in its day-to-day provision. Any employee of any public safety
agency which is a participant in a 911 emergency telephone service may
respond and take any action to any call whether within or without the authorized territorial jurisdiction of the public safety agency. In response to emergency calls, employees of public safety agencies shall have the same immunity
for any acts performed in the line of duty outside their authorized jurisdictions
as they enjoy within their authorized jurisdictions. No cause of action is created by any incorrect dispatch or response by any system or any public safety
agency or by reason of elapsed response time.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-6, enacted
1986, ch. 33, § 1.

by L.

Cross-References. - Governmental immunity, Title 63, Chapter 30.
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69-2-7. Limitation of liabilities.
Except as provided in Section 69-2-8, nothing contained in this chapter is
deemed to establish or impose upon any provider of local telephone exchange
service or the provider, of terminal equipment needed to implement the provision of the 911 emergency telephone service any duties or liabilities beyond
those otherwise specified by law.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-7, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 33, § l; 1991, ch. 159, § I.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amend-

69-2-8.

ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the exception at the beginning of the section.

Liabilities of providers.

(1) A provider of local telephone exchange service may by tariff or agreement with a subscriber provide for the subscriber's release of claims, suits, or
demands against such provider based upon a disclosure or a nondisclosure of
an unlisted or nonpublished telephone number and address, and the related
address, if a call for any 911 emergency telephone service is made from the
subscriber's premises.
(2) A provider oflocal telephone exchange service or a provider of telephone
terminal equipment needed to implement the provision or enhancement of
911 emergency telephone service, and their employees and agents, are not
liable for any damages in a civil action for injuries, death, or loss to person or
property incurred as a result of any act or omission of such provider, employee, or agent, in connection with developing, adopting, implementing,
maintaining, enhancing, or operating a 911 emergency telephone service,
except for damages or injury intentionally caused by any such provider or
person or resulting from gross negligence of such provider or person.
History: C. 1953, 69-2-8, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 159, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1991, ch. 159 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 3
TELECOMMUNICATION TOWERS AND
RELATED FACILITIES
Section
69-3-1.
69-3-2.

Authority to acquire sites - Title.
Acquisition of sites by eminent domain.

Section
69-3-3.
69-3-4.
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69-3-1. Authority to acquire sites -

69-3-4

Title.

The state, counties, cities, and towns may create or acquire sites to accommodate the erection of telecommunication towers and related facilities. Title
to these sites shall be retained by the state, county, city, or town acquiring
such sites in order to promote the location of such towers in a manageable
area and to protect the aesthetics and environment of the area.
History: C. 1953, 69-3-1, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 95, § 1.

Cross-References. - Division of Information Technology Services, § 63A-6-101 et seq.

69-3-2. Acquisition of sites by eminent domain.
The state, counties, cities, and towns may acquire land for the creation of
such tower sites by eminent domain or otherwise.
History: C. 1953, 69-3-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 95, § 2.

Cross-References. - Eminent domain, Title 69, Chapter 3.

69-3-3. Use of sites.
The state, county, city, or town after acquiring a site shall permit the public
use of such site subject to the following conditions:
(1) The facilities and access roads are designed and constructed so as to
minimally disturb the natural terrain;
(2) The owner of any tower on such site agrees to accommodate the
multiple use of the tower where feasible; and
(3) The owner of any tower agrees to pay to the state, county, city, or
town, as the case may be, the fair market rental value for the use of the
site.
History: C. 1953, 69-3-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 95, § 3.

69-3-4. Grandfather clause.
This chapter shall not affect the use, operation, expansion, or construction
of towers and related facilities on property owned by telecommunication companies as of January 1, 1986.
History: C. 1953, 69-3-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 95, § 4.

Cross-References. - Uniform operation of
laws, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 24.
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CHAPTER 4
TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORK
REVIEW
Section
69-4-1.

Telecommunication network review.

69-4-1. Telecommunication

network review.

(1) Before the creation, expansion, or upgrade of a state-owned or statefunded telecommunication network, whether voice, data, or video transmission, the agency or entity proposing any change shall submit a plan to the
governor detailing the proposed changes.
(2) If, after consultation with the agency or entity it is the opinion of the
governor that implementation of the plan would result in significant impact
on telephone ratepayers, the governor shall direct the Public Service Commission to prepare an advisory report detailing how implementing the plan will
affect telephone ratepayers where the plan would be in effect.
(3) (a) The Public Service Commission shall complete and provide the advisory report to the governor, the agency or entity involved, and the Legislature's State and Local Affairs Interim Committee within 60 days after
receiving the governor's request.
(b) The Public Service Commission may not conduct any public hearings or proceedings in the preparation of the report.
History: C. 1953, 69-4-1, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 61, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1991, ch. 61 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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